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What part of the inequality observed in a particular 
country is due to unequal opportunities, rather than 
to differences in individual efforts or luck? This paper 
estimates a lower bound for the opportunity share of 
inequality in labor earnings, household income per 
capita and household consumption per capita in six 
Latin American countries. Following John Roemer, 
the authors associate inequality of opportunity with 
outcome differences that can be accounted for by morally 
irrelevant pre-determined circumstances, such as race, 
gender, place of birth, and family background. Thus 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
measure and understand inequality of opportunity. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at fferreira@worldbank.org and jgignoux@worldbank.org. 
defined, unequal opportunities account for between 24 
and 50 percent of inequality in consumption expenditure 
in the sample. Brazil and Central America are more 
opportunity-unequal than Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru. 
“Opportunity profiles,” which identify the social groups 
with the most limited opportunity sets, are shown to 
be distinct from poverty profiles: ethnic origin and the 
geography of birth are markedly more important as 
determinants of opportunity deprivation than of outcome 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic inequality – usually measured in terms of income or consumption – is 
neither all bad nor all good. Most people view income gaps that arise from the application 
of different levels of effort as less objectionable than those that are due, say, to racial 
discrimination. Attitudinal surveys attest to this. When asked to place their views on a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 implied agreement with the statement that “Incomes should 
be made more equal,” and 10 implied agreement with the statement that “We need larger 
income differences as incentives for individual effort”, respondents in the 1999-2000 
World Value Survey were evenly divided.
1 The median answer was 6. The two modes of 
the distribution, with approximately 20% of respondents each, were 1 and 10.  
Attitudes to inequality vary for a number of reasons, but an important factor is 
whether inequalities are seen to be driven by differences in factors for which the 
individual can be held morally accountable (i.e. where he or she had a choice), or by 
factors that lie beyond the individual’s responsibility. In an influential contribution, John 
Roemer (1998) calls the former “efforts”, and the latter “circumstances”. He describes 
“equality of opportunity” as a situation in which important outcomes – which he calls 
“advantages”, and which would include measures of economic welfare such as earnings 
or household consumption – are distributed independently of circumstances. A situation, 
in other words, where the distribution of economic welfare within groups of people with 
identical circumstances would not vary across such groups.
2  
The distinction between inequality of opportunity and the more standard concept 
of inequality of outcomes is of interest to economists for at least three sets of reasons. 
First, if inequality of opportunity does affect attitudes to outcome inequality, then it may 
affect attitudes to redistribution and beliefs about social fairness. These beliefs may in 
turn affect the extent of redistribution actually implemented, and the level of investment 
and output generated. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) are 
                                                 
1 The World Value Survey is conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, based at the University of Michigan, and contains responses from representative samples in 69 
countries.  
2 Roemer (1998) was not, of course, the first economist or philosopher to argue that the space of 
opportunities was ethically the right one to focus on. Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989) and, to some extent, 
Sen (1985) had made broadly similar points. By providing a simple, yet powerful, formalization of the 
definition of equal opportunities, however, Roemer contributed to an increase in interest in the concept 
from applied economists.   3
examples of models where such beliefs and attitudes play a key role in generating 
multiple equilibria with very different objective economic characteristics.   
Second, there is a widespread normative view that inequality of opportunity 
matters for the design of public policy, since only differences due to opportunities should 
be the object of compensation by the state. This is the view in Arneson (1989), Roemer 
(1998) and Peragine (2004), to mention but a few. Third, it has also been suggested that 
inequality of opportunity might be a more relevant concept (than income inequality) for 
understanding whether aggregate economic performance is worse in more unequal 
societies (and if so, why). In addition to the role of beliefs and attitudes to redistribution, 
it is possible that the kinds of inequality that are detrimental to growth (such as inequality 
in access to good schools, or to financial markets) are more closely associated with the 
concept of opportunities, while other components of outcome inequality – such as those 
arising from differential returns to effort – may actually have a positive effect on growth 
(World Bank, 2006; Bourguignon et al. 2007). Perhaps one of the reasons why the cross-
country empirical literature on inequality and growth is so inconclusive is that it conflates 
the two kinds of inequality.
3 
  But in order to make any empirical use of the concept of inequality of 
opportunity, whether in the design of taxation and public expenditures or in the study of 
the determinants of cross-country growth differences, it is first necessary to measure it. 
Some progress in that direction has been made. Bourguignon et al. (2003, 2007) 
parametrically estimate inequality of opportunity for various cohorts in Brazil, in 1996. 
Checchi and Peragine (2005) apply a non-parametric decomposition to measure 
inequality of opportunity for both income and educational achievement in Southern and 
Northern Italy.
4 Lefranc et al. (2006) use stochastic dominance rankings to compare the 
degree of inequality of opportunity among a set of OECD countries.
5 Barros et al. (2008) 
associate inequality of opportunity for children with unequal access to a set of basic 
services, and compute indices for a set of countries in Latin America. Cogneau et al. 
                                                 
3 See Forbes (2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003). 
4 See also Cogneau and Gignoux (2007), on earnings in Brazil. 
5 See also Hild and Voorhoeve (2004) on the philosophical implications of using stochastic dominance 
criteria for evaluating the extent of inequality of opportunity.   4
(2006) apply a variant of the Bourguignon et al. (2007) approach to a set of African 
countries. 
Nevertheless, the empirical study of inequality of opportunity remains a nascent – 
though increasingly vibrant – field. This paper aims to make three contributions, the first 
two of which are methodological. First, we provide a simple conceptual framework 
which derives a class of indices of inequality of opportunity directly from Roemer’s 
theory. The parametric measure proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007) and the non-
parametric indices in Checchi and Peragine (2005) are shown to be members of this class, 
which can therefore be seen as a unifying concept in the measurement of inequality of 
opportunity. Indices within the class differ along two dimensions: decomposition path 
and  estimation procedure. Drawing on the earlier literature on path dependence in 
inequality decomposition (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000), we show that there exists a 
unique inequality index (the mean log deviation) for which our measure of inequality of 
opportunity is path-independent.
6 For that index, this class of measures collapses to a 
parametric and a non-parametric alternative along the estimation procedure dimension. 
We show that the two methods provide a narrow range of lower-bound estimates for 
inequality of opportunity in a set of six Latin American countries.  
Second, we introduce the concept of an opportunity-deprivation profile: a vector 
of characteristics of the groups with the most limited opportunity sets in a given society 
(a precise definition follows). Following Roemer’s (2006) suggestion that “the rate of 
economic development should be taken to be the rate at which the mean advantage level 
of the worst-off types grows over time.” (p.243), we compare these profiles across our 
sample of six Latin American countries. We also compare these profiles to the analogous 
poverty profiles, and suggest an interpretation of the differences. 
The third contribution is substantive. We apply these two methodological 
innovations to a rich set of household data for six countries in Latin America: Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru. In each case, we observe information 
on six “circumstance” variables, namely gender, race or ethnicity, place of birth, mother’s 
education, father’s education and father’s occupation. We are not aware of a comparable 
                                                 
6 Strictly, this uniqueness is within the set of inequality measures that satisfy the transfer principle, and use 
the arithmetic mean as the representative income (see Foster and Shneyerov, 2000).   5
data set being previously used for the comparative analysis of inequality of opportunity 
anywhere in the world.  
The paper presents parametric and non-parametric estimates of our path-
independent measure of inequality of opportunity for three distinct indicators of 
economic advantage – labor earnings, household per capita income, and household per 
capita consumption – and discusses the significant differences among them. A number of 
interesting cross-country patterns appear, both with respect to overall levels of inequality 
of opportunity, and to the relative importance of individual circumstance variables. 
Brazil, Guatemala and Panama are found to be systematically more opportunity-unequal 
than Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Ethnic inequalities are also stronger in Brazil and in 
the two Central American countries, whereas geographic inequalities are greater in the 
two Central American countries and in Peru. 
At the lower bound, inequality of opportunity is found to account for a substantial 
share of observed economic inequality in Latin America. For inequality in household 
consumption expenditures per capita, for instance, the (parametrically estimated) 
opportunity share ranges from 24% to 50%, depending on the country. The results are 
different for earnings and for household incomes, reflecting differences both in the 
economic mechanisms through which circumstances affect outcomes, and in 
questionnaire design and likely measurement error. The opportunity profiles also differ 
substantially among countries, with ethnicity being fundamental in Brazil but much less 
important in Colombia, for instance. Opportunity profiles also differ from poverty 
profiles, reflecting the fact that circumstances matter, but are not destiny: effort and luck 
enable some of those born in opportunity-disadvantaged groups to escape poverty, while 
others - born to more advantaged groups - fall into it. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a 
conceptual framework by deriving a simple class of measures of inequality of opportunity 
from Roemer’s definition of the concept. Section 3 describes four alternative members of 
that class that can be estimated in practice, and discusses their properties. Section 4 
provides some information on the six household survey data sets used in the analysis. 
Section 5 reports the results of the alternative estimation procedures for labor earnings. 
Section 6 presents the results for household welfare, based on per capita income and   6
consumption expenditure distributions. Section 7 discusses the opportunity profiles for all 
six countries, and how they compare with the poverty profiles. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  A Conceptual Framework  
 
A natural approach to measuring inequality of opportunity would begin from 
Roemer’s (1998) distinction between “circumstance” and “effort” variables. Following 
Bourguignon et al. (2007), consider a “model of advantage” of the general form: 
() u E C f y , , =            ( 1 )  
where y denotes the outcome of interest (Roemer’s “advantage”); C denotes a vector of 
circumstance variables; E denotes a vector of effort variables; and u denotes pure luck or 
other random factors. Roemer’s theory explicitly requires that circumstances be 
economically exogenous (in the sense that the individual has no control over them).
7  But 
it also explicitly allows for the fact that efforts may be endogenous to circumstances. For 
example: one can not change one’s race, or the family one is born into, but those factors 
can and do affect one’s educational and work choices. Incorporating the fact that efforts 
are endogenous and may thus depend on circumstances, (1) can be rewritten as: 
  () [] u v C E C f y , , , =             ( 2 )  
Roemer’s definition of equality of opportunity essentially requires that 










, i.e. no circumstance variable should have a direct causal impact 
on y;  
(ii)  ()() C E E G C E G ∀ ∀ = , , , each effort variable should be distributed independently 
from all circumstances.
 8  
                                                 
7 We write “economically exogenous” to distinguish the original meaning of the term from the common 
econometric usage, which refers to a correlation between the variable and the residual term. In the case of 
circumstance variables, econometric endogeneity  could arise from the existence of omitted variables, but 
not from reverse causation. 
8 A third condition, which holds by assumption, is  ( ) ( ) u H C u H = , i.e. random factors and luck are also 
independent from circumstances.
 F, G and H denote cumulative distributions. For simplicity, we omit 
subscripts for individual elements of the  circumstance and effort vectors, and the corresponding   7
To measure inequality of opportunity is therefore to measure the extent to which 
() () y F C y F ≠ . An obvious first step would be to test for the existence of inequality of 
opportunity, by examining whether the conditional distributions  ( ) C y F  differ across the 
elements of C. This is precisely what Lefranc et al. (2006) do, using stochastic 
dominance concepts and the associated statistical tests to compare the distribution of 
opportunities across a number of OECD countries. Theirs is a very interesting approach 
to ascertaining whether or not individual countries could be described as having equality 
of opportunity. It also allows for a (partial) ranking of types (groups with identical 
circumstances) within each country. As always, though, greater robustness in ranking 
comes at a price. Testing for dominance across cumulative distribution functions for 
different types does not permit a quantification of how far those groups are from one 
another. Consequently it does not really allow for a ranking of inequality of opportunity 
across countries, beyond a binary classification into “equal” or “unequal”.  
In this paper, we follow a complementary approach and seek to construct scalar 
indices of inequality of opportunity, based on partitioning the population by circumstance 
categories. Given agreement on a particular vector of circumstance variables C, define 
{ }
k
i y  as a partition of the distribution such that  K k k i C C
k k
i ,..., 1 , = ∈ ⇔ = .
9  { }
k
i y  is 
then a partition of the population into K groups, such that the members of each group are 
identical with respect to all circumstances in the vector C. The set of individuals 
k i i k ∈ Τ :  is simply what Roemer would refer to as type k. Defining the partition { }
k
i y  
requires agreement on a vector C, for which the joint distribution  ) , ( C y F  is observed, as 
well as agreement on the specific partitioning within each variable: for example, how 
finely the vector of mother’s years of schooling, or the spatial location of birth, are to be 
subdivided. We are looking for a scalar measure  { } + ℜ →
k
i y : θ  that captures the degree 
of inequality of opportunity in the partition.
10  
                                                                                                                                                 
proliferation of notation for the distributions. See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menéndez (2007) for a related 
discussion. 
9 It must be the case, of course, that K ≤ N, where N is the size of the population. 
10 More formally, one could write  ( ) + ℜ → Π × ℑ C C y, : θ , where  ( ) C y, ℑ  denotes the space of joint 
distribution functions of y and C, while  C Π  denotes the set of possible partitions of a population by the   8
Next, note that for any meaningful definition of between-group inequality, 
stochastic independence implies: 
  () () { } ( ) 0 = ⇒ =
k
i y IB y F C y F         ( 3 )    
where  { } ( )
k
i y IB  denotes the between-group component of inequality over the previously 
constructed partition of the population.
11 It follows that two natural candidates for 
{ } + ℜ →
k
i y : θ  would be indices of the form: 




i y IB y = θ           ( 4 )  
or  {} () { } ( )





i = θ           ( 5 )  
Equation (4) defines a measure of inequality of opportunity as the absolute level 
of the inequality between groups in a population, where those groups arise from an 
agreed partition of the population, so that members of each group share identical 
circumstances, in Roemer’s sense. Equation (5) defines it as the same between-group 
inequality, relative to overall inequality in the population. As a relative measure, (5) is 
actually a mapping  { } [] 1 , 0 : →
k
i y θ , for any decomposable inequality index I().
12 
As in other contexts (like simple poverty and inequality measurement), absolute 
and relative measures convey different information, and rank populations differently. 
Both are useful, and should be seen as complementary. In what follows, we focus on the 
relative-Θ class, largely to economize on space, but both the relative and the absolute 
measures may be of interest. The methodological points in the remainder of this section 
can be easily extended to the absolute-Θ class, in a perfectly analogous fashion. 
 
3.   Calculating Relative-Θ Measures in Practice 
 
It is well-known from the inequality decomposition literature that  { } ( )
k
i y IB  is not 
a uniquely defined object, even if attention is confined to inequality indices that are 
                                                                                                                                                 
elements of C. This recognizes that the notation { }
k
i y  conflates two components: a joint distribution of y 
and C, and a specific partition of the population by the elements of C. 
11 The converse statement does not hold, as the inexistence of between-group inequality is a much weaker 
condition than stochastic independence. 
12 On decomposable inequality indices, see Bourguignon (1979) or Shorrocks (1980).   9
properly decomposable.
13 In fact, for a given { }
k
i y , estimates of between-group inequality 
can differ for three reasons: (i) the specific inequality index I() used in the 
decomposition; (ii) the path of the decomposition; and (iii) the decomposition procedure, 
i.e. whether it is estimated parametrically or non-parametrically.  
Point (i) is well-established in the literature. The decomposition of inequality by 
population subgroup for a given distribution and partition will differ across different 
members of the Generalized Entropy or Atkinson families. To see point (ii), following 
Foster and Shneyerov (2000) and Checchi and Peragine (2005), define: 
- a smoothed distribution { }
k
i μ , corresponding to a particular partition { }
k
i y , as the 
distribution that arises from replacing 
k
i y  with the group-specific mean 
k μ . 
- a standardized distribution { }
k
i ν  corresponding to a particular partition { }
k
i y  as 
the distribution that arises from replacing 
k





 (where μ is the grand mean). 
Since a smoothed distribution eliminates all within-group inequality by 
construction, a first member of the relative-Θ class immediately suggests itself as 




i d y I I μ θ = .  d θ  is simply the ratio of inequality in the smoothed distribution to 
the inequality in the original distribution. It summarizes between-group inequality in the 
partition directly, hence the subscript d.  
A standardized distribution, on the other hand, suppresses all between-group 




i r y I I ν θ − =1 , one minus the 
ratio of inequality in the standardized distribution to the inequality in the original 
distribution, is therefore another perfectly plausible measure of inequality of opportunity. 
It computes the between-group inequality in the partition residually, hence the subscript 
r. 
14  
                                                 
13 The literature on inequality measurement (e.g. Bourguignon 1979, Shorrocks 1980) has established that 
total inequality is only additively separable into a between-group component and a within-group 
component for some indices. The best-known family of additively decomposable measures is the 
generalized entropy class, which includes the mean log deviation (E(0)) and the Theil entropy index (E(1)). 
The Gini coefficient is not additively decomposable in the same way.  See also Elbers et al. (2008). 
14 This straightforward, non-parametric decomposition is very similar to Checchi and Peragine (2005), who 
proposed either to re-weight the distributions of outcome in order to equalize the means of the different 
circumstances groups (in a “types approach”) or to reweight the means of the individuals who can be 
considered as having exerted the same efforts (in a  “tranches approach”).    10
Unfortunately, although there is no obvious reason why either one of these two 
paths should be preferred to the other, for most inequality indexes they will yield 
different measures of the share of between-group inequalities (and thus of inequality of 
opportunity).
15 Foster and Shneyerov (2000) characterize the class of inequality measures 
for which the two methods yield the same results; namely the “path-independent 
decomposable” class of inequality measures. They show that when the set of inequality 
indices under consideration is restricted to those that use the arithmetic mean as the 
reference income, and that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom, this class reduces to a 
single inequality measure, the mean log deviation, or E(0).  
This has a helpful implication for our attempt to measure inequality of 
opportunity using (4) or (5). It implies that, if we are prepared to adopt the Foster-
Shneyerov path-independence axiom, then the first two of the three previously mentioned 
reasons for estimates of between-group inequality to vary are eliminated: if we focus on 
path-independent measures that also satisfy the transfer axiom, we must use the mean log 
deviation as our inequality index I(), and  r d θ θ = . Differences due both to the use of 
different aggregation indices and to path-dependence are eliminated simultaneously.
16  
                                                 
15 It is easy to see why the two decomposition paths yield different results for other generalized entropy 
measures. The decomposition of total inequality for these measures can be written as follows: 
























    (eq. 3 in Foster and Sneyerov (2000)) 
where 
k x  for k=1,…,m, denote the distribution of outcomes within each sub-group, 
B x  is the smoothed 
distribution, n  the total population, 
k n  the population of sub-group k, μ  the overall mean, and 
k μ  the 
sub-group mean. c is a parameter for each GE measure. IB is the between-group component. IW is a 
weighted sum of the inequality measured within each sub-group. The problem is that, for  0 ≠ c , the 
within-group component is affected by changes in 
k μ .  Standardizing the distribution will therefore not 
only eliminate IB. It will also affect IW, by changing the weights associated with the inequality within each 
sub-group. 
16 There is a sense in which measures based on the smoothed distribution correspond to van de Gaer’s 
concept of “min-of-means”, because they focus exclusively on information about the mean advantage 
levels of each type, while the measures derived from the standardized distribution are closer to Roemer’s 
“mean-of-mins” approach, in the sense that it first removes differences between the types, and then 
compares the (“relative effort”) distributions within each type. See Fleurbaey (2008). In this paper, we 
deliberately gloss over that philosophical debate, other than to note that we identify a particular measure, 
axiomatically derived, for which both approaches yield identical results. We see that as an added advantage 
of our approach.     11
  If one is interested only in an overall estimate of  {} () { } ( )





i = θ , and if one’s 
sample is sufficiently large relative to the number of cells in the partition { }
k
i y , then we 
need go no further: the between-group share of inequality for E(0), in a partition defined 
by a vector of circumstances, is our single scalar estimate of a lower bound for inequality 
of opportunity. Unfortunately, however, the richer the information set on people’s 
circumstances, the more cells one would like to include in the partition. As cell numbers 
increase, cell sizes diminish, leading to the classic problem of data insufficiency for non-
parametric estimation. This has led some authors to propose parametric alternatives to the 
estimation of  d θ  and  r θ .  
In order to construct these alternatives, define a parametrically standardized 
distribution {} i y ~ , corresponding to F(y, C), as the distribution that arises from replacing 
yi with  ( ) [ ] i i i u v C E C f y , , , ~ = , where the upper bar on the vector C denotes the vector of 
sample mean circumstances.
17  
To obtain this counterfactual distribution, a specific model of (2) must be 
estimated. Once this has been done, { } i y ~  is obtained simply by replacing the individual 
circumstance values in (2) with the sample average for each circumstance variable. A 
variety of alternative specifications for (2) is possible, of course. Bourguignon et al. 
(2007) use a log-linear/linear specification of the form: 
v BC E
u E C y
+ =
+ + = β α ln
         ( 6 )      
The reduced form of (6) is  ( ) u v B C y + + + = β β α ln , which can be estimated by 
OLS as  ε ψ + = C y l n .            ( 7 )  
Under these functional form assumptions, the parametrically standardized 
distribution is estimated by  [ ] i i i C y ε ψ ˆ ˆ exp ˆ ~ + = .  
Analogously, define a parametrically smoothed distribution  { } i z ~ , corresponding 
to F(y, C), as the distribution that arises from replacing yi with  () [] C E C f zi , ~ = , where 
                                                 
17 This is (parametrically) analogous to the standardized distribution because, by giving each and every 
individual the same circumstance variables, it eliminates any inequality between groups that are associated 
with circumstances.   12
the error term of the model is suppressed. This counterfactual distribution is also obtained 
by estimating a specific parametric model for (2), and suppressing within-group 
inequality by replacing yi with its prediction, given the vector of circumstances C. In a 
reduced-form framework, and under the functional form assumptions above, the 
parametrically smoothed distribution is estimated by  [ ] ψ ˆ exp ˆ ~
i i C z = . 




r y I y I ~ 1− = θ   as a parametric 










d y I z I ~ = θ  as a parametric 






d y I I μ θ = ,  where the superscripts now refer to the (parametric 




d θ  and 
N
r θ , 
P
d θ  and 
P
r θ  rely on specific functional form assumptions. In 
addition to the possible sample-size insufficiency for non-parametric estimation, there is 
another reason why the costs of such a parametric approximation may be worth bearing: 
the parametric approach permits the estimation of the partial effects of one (or a subset) 
of the circumstance variables, controlling for the others, by constructing alternative 
counterfactual distributions, such as: 
[] i





i u C C y ˆ ˆ exp ˆ ~ + + =
≠ ≠ ψ ψ         ( 8 )  
in the case of a parametrically standardized decomposition. This allows us to compute 
circumstance J-specific inequality shares: 






r y I y I ~ 1− = θ          ( 9 )  
  The existence of this trade-off between parametric and non-parametric methods - 
with non-parametric decompositions being more flexible (with no functional form 
assumptions) but more data intensive, while the parametric approach is less data intensive 
but relies on (potentially restrictive) functional form assumptions – points to two things: 
the need to investigate their comparative performance on the same data set (as we do 
below), and the possibility that the methods may usefully complement each other.  
  A final methodological consideration refers to the interpretation of these 
measures, given the realistic possibility that not all relevant circumstance variables may 
                                                 
18 The measure computed for Brazil by Bourguignon et al. (2007) was an example of a parametric residual 
measure: 
P
r θ .   13
be observed. A “true” measure of inequality of opportunity, as conceptually defined in 
equations (3) – (5), would require that all relevant circumstance variables be included in 
the vector C. This is unlikely to be the case in practice for almost any conceivable data 
set, and certainly for the six countries we study below. The empirical estimates defined in 
this section – whether direct or residual, and parametric or not – should be interpreted as 
lower-bound estimates of inequality of opportunity. To see why they are lower bounds, 
note that including an additional element in vector C causes each and every cell in the 
partition { }
k
i y  to be further subdivided (into at least another two cells). This can not lower 
the between-group inequality share and, unless the additional element is orthogonal to the 
measure of advantage, will raise it.  
An additional reason why the measure is a lower-bound is that the partitioning of 
the population into categories within each circumstance variable in C is very coarse in 
this paper. An example is the classification of parental occupations into only two cells: 
“agricultural worker” or “other”. For most circumstance variables, international 
comparability required aiming for “common denominator”, relatively aggregated 
classifications. Like adding other circumstance variables, further subdivision of these 
categories within each circumstance might also increase (but could not reduce) the share 
of inequality attributed to opportunities. 
  Similarly, in the parametric case, notice that equation (7) is a reduced-form 
specification, intended to capture both the direct and indirect effects of circumstances on 
advantage. Adding another element of the vector C to this specification (or further 
refining the set of dummy variables for each circumstance) must reduce the variance of 
the residual and increase the variance (or any other inequality measure) accounted for by 
the set of observed circumstances.
19  
In what follows, we calculate three of the four members of the relative-Θ class – 
namely 
N
d θ , 
N
r θ   and 
P
r θ  - for the distributions of earnings, income and consumption in 
                                                 
19 A possible misunderstanding would be to argue that, because certain omitted circumstances might be 
negatively correlated with the observed vector C, the parametric measure need not be a lower bound. It is 
of course possible that the share of inequality attributed to a specific set of (observed) circumstances is 
overestimated. This might happen if omitted circumstance variables are negatively correlated with the 
observed ones. But the R
2 of regression (7) can not fall by including these other circumstance variables, so 
that the estimate is a lower-bound for the share of inequality attributed to all circumstances (rather than to 
the observed subset), analogously to the non-parametric case.   14
recent household surveys from six Latin American countries. We show that the two non-
parametric indices differ for decomposable inequality measures other than E(0), but focus 
our discussion on that index, for which  
N
d θ  = 
N
r θ . We then examine the differences 
between the non-parametric and parametric estimates. Although, as expected, these 
differences are larger for smaller sample sizes, they are generally quite small, suggesting 
that our path-independent estimates of inequality of opportunity are also 
methodologically robust to the choice of estimation procedure. Before presenting the 
results for each concept in Sections 5 and 6, the next section briefly describes the data 
sets.  
 
4.  The Data and the Partition by Circumstances 
 
We use data from six nationally representative household surveys in Latin 
America, namely the Brazilian Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) 
1996; the Colombian Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (ECV) 2003; the Ecuadorian Encuesta 
Condiciones de Vida (ECV) 2006; the Guatemalan Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones 
de Vida (ENCOVI) 2000; the Panamanian Encuesta de Niveles de Vida (ENV) 2003; and 
the Peruvian Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 2001. The ENAHO and the 
PNAD are original national surveys, while the others are LSMS-type surveys. This 
particular group of surveys were selected for containing information on family 
background and, more specifically, on parents’ education, father’s occupation, or both.
20  
In all countries, we restrict the sample to individuals aged 30 to 49, which are the 
cohorts with the highest proportion of employed persons.
21 Sample sizes for each survey, 
both before and after excluding observations with missing data, are reported in Table 1. 
Sample sizes with complete information range from about 6,000 (for Panama) to 72,000 
observations (for Brazil), for the analysis of income and consumption, and from about 
                                                 
20 The Encuesta Nacional sobre Niveles de Vida de los Hogares (MxFLS) 2002 contains a similar set of 
variables. Unfortunately its simple size proved to be too small relative to the partition to generate reliable 
results. 
21 For Brazil, we further restrict the sample to household heads and their spouses, as the family background 
information was collected only for these individuals.   15
4,000 to 50,000 for the analysis of earnings (when only employed individuals are 
retained).
22 
The surveys contain information on a common set of circumstances: (a) three 
variables related to family background: father’s and mother’s education and father’s 
occupation during the person’s childhood; (b) ethnicity (or race); and (c) region of birth 
(or type of area of birth). The only exceptions are that the father’s occupation variable is 
not available for Colombia and Peru, and results must be interpreted with this caveat in 
mind. We also use gender as a circumstance variable in the analysis of earnings. Parental 
education variables are coded into three categories: no education (or unknown), primary 
(incomplete or complete, depending on the country), and complete primary or secondary 
and more.
23 Father’s occupation is recoded into two categories: agricultural workers and 
others. Ethnicity (coded in two categories) is captured either by self-reported ethnicity or 
by the ability to speak an indigenous language. Region of birth is coded into three broad 
regions (one being generally the capital area) but is captured by the type of area 
(urban/rural) for Panama. Table 2 describes the specific definitions of the circumstance 
variables in each survey in greater detail. Table 3 (Panel A) presents the corresponding 
descriptive statistics. 
The number of categories for each circumstance variable was restricted to three or 
fewer, so as to reduce the number of “circumstances group” cells with zero or very few 
observations. As discussed in Section 3, this is important for the non-parametric analysis, 
which relies on the quality of the estimates for conditional means in these cells and their 
sampling variation may be very high for cells containing few observations. This greater 
sampling variance might artificially inflate the estimated inequality between groups, 
thereby inducing an over-estimation of inequality of opportunity. Table 4 shows the 
maximum number of cells in each survey, the number of cells actually observed (i.e. the 
complement of the number of empty cells), the mean cell size and the proportion of cells 
                                                 
22 Employment rates are defined as the ratio of all employed individuals to all persons in the 30-49 age-
group. These rates for men and women (respectively) are: 0.90 and 0.55 in Brazil; 0.91 and 0.62 in 
Colombia; 0.97 and 0.72 in Ecuador; 0.96 and 0.51 in Guatemala; 0.91 and 0.53 in Panama; and 0.94 and 
0.72 in Peru.  
23 Whether complete primary attainment was included as part of the middle or upper grouping for parental 
education depends on relative group sizes. An effort was made to prevent the top grouping from being too 
small relative to other countries, to enhance comparability. None of the results is particularly sensitive to 
these decisions.   16
with fewer than five observations. Despite observing only six circumstance variables and 
exercising considerable parsimony in the partitioning of the population, we still have two 
surveys – from Guatemala and Panama – for which over 20% (40%) of cells have fewer 
than five observations in the income/consumption (earnings) analysis. By contrast, 
Brazil’s national PNAD survey, with a sample size one order of magnitude larger, has 
6%-8% of cells with fewer than five observations. This reflects the limited sample sizes 
of LSMS surveys, and underscores the importance of the parametric estimates in 
validating (or refuting) the non-parametric results presented below. 
Turning to the advantage variables, labor earnings are measured on an individual 
basis as monthly earnings from all occupations, including the monetary value of various 
in-kind payments. Family incomes and consumption are measured as per capita 
household income (from all sources) and per capita aggregate household consumption. 
Aggregates for family incomes are computed as the sum of all household members’ 
individual incomes, and include all jobs earnings plus other incomes such as those from 
assets, pensions and transfers.
24  
Consumption expenditure data is not available for Brazil. Elsewhere, the reference 
period is the year, but some expenditures are captured on a weekly or monthly basis. 
Consumption aggregates do differ across surveys in some respects. In particular, income 
and consumption are adjusted for differences in the local cost of living in most LSMS 
datasets (Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama but not Colombia) and in the Peruvian 
ENAHO dataset. LSMS surveys (Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama) and the 
ENAHO survey also include imputed rents for owner-occupied housing in both 
consumption and income aggregates, whereas the PNAD does not. Table 3 (Panel B) 
reports means and standard deviations for these three economic advantage variables. 
 
5.  Inequality in Earnings Opportunity  
 
  In most societies, remuneration for one’s work in the labor market is an important 
component of overall income, and thus a key determinant of a person’s command over 
                                                 
24 The reference period for the earnings of self-employed workers, which is the month in Brazil, Colombia, 
and Peru; depends on the frequency of payments in Panama; and is the year elsewhere. For wage earnings 
the reference period is the month in all surveys.   17
private goods. Some argue that it is also directly related to self-esteem and social status. 
Furthermore, it is affected both by one’s own choices and efforts, and by exogenous 
circumstances. Labor earnings would therefore certainly qualify as an “advantage” 
concept in Roemer’s terms.  
  As noted by Lefranc et al. (2006), Roemer’s concept of equality of opportunity 
for earnings would require that the distribution of earnings conditional on any 
circumstance variable be identical to the marginal distribution – i.e. that there should be 
no difference across the earnings distributions estimated for particular population 
subgroups defined according to their circumstances.
25 Figure 1 shows the distributions of 
earnings conditional on mother’s education (Panel A) and on ethnicity (Panel B), for our 
six countries. At least in the case of mother’s education, first order dominance should be 
satisfied in most countries as conditional distribution functions never cross.
26 The 
distances between circumstance groups appear particularly high in Brazil and Panama. 
There are also pronounced visual differences in the ethnicity panel, with the distance 
between ethnic groups being higher in Guatemala and Brazil.  
The scalar inequality measures developed in Section 3 can help us quantify these 
inter-country differences, as well as allowing us to consider the combined (and partial) 
effects of all six circumstance variables. Table 5 presents our main results for earnings 
opportunity. The first row contains the estimates of overall earnings inequality in each of 
the six countries, using three indices from the generalized entropy class of measures: the 
mean log deviation, E(0); Theil index, E(1); and half the square of the coefficient of 
variation, E(2).
27 Below each point estimate, we report bootstrapped standard errors,   
computed using 100 replicates of the sample, taking into account weights, stratification 
and clustering for each re-sampling. Since they refer only to a selected sub-sample of the 
working population, as described in Table 1 (which largely corresponds to 30-49 year-
olds), these are not national measures of earnings inequality. Nevertheless, the indices are 
                                                 
25 This is the strongest concept of equality of opportunity. Lefranc et al. (2006) allow for weaker concepts, 
such as there being no first- or second-order stochastic dominance between the conditional distributions. 
26 These figures are included as an illustration only, and are not the focus of our analysis. Statistical  tests 
for stochastic dominance (Davidson and Duclos, 2000) are therefore not reported in this paper. 
27 As noted earlier, all generalized entropy measures are additively decomposable by population subgroup.   18
generally high: mean log deviations are 0.572 in Panama, 0.608 in Colombia, 0.616 in 
Brazil, 0.638 in Ecuador, 0.675 in Peru and 0.786 in Guatemala.
28  
  The next two rows of Table 5 present our non-parametric estimates of the 
opportunity share of inequality in earnings, given by 
N
d θ  and 
N
r θ , on the basis of the 
partitions described in Section 4 and Table 2. We report the measures for all three 
inequality indices (E(0), E(1), and E(2)). As noted in Section 3, we focus our discussion 
on E(0), the only measure for which 
N
d θ  = 
N
r θ . By this measure, differences in observed 
opportunity account for 20% of total earnings inequality in Colombia, 21% in Peru, 25% 
in Panama, 26% in Ecuador, 29% in Guatemala and 35% in Brazil. The differences 
between Brazil and any other country, with the exception of Guatemala, are statistically 
significant at 5% (as are the differences between Guatemala and Peru or Colombia).
29 In 
other words: a fairly coarse partition of the population by six circumstance variables 
accounts for between one-fifth and one-third of total earnings inequality.  
It is interesting to note that this ranking is different from the ranking of overall 
earnings inequality. In particular, Brazil, which has only the fourth highest earnings 
inequality in the sample, has by far the largest opportunity share of that inequality. 
Similarly, Panama, which has the lowest earnings inequality, ranks above Colombia and 
Peru in opportunity share. Such re-ranking suggests that inequality of opportunity and 
inequality of outcomes are not simply different ways of measuring the same thing: they 
capture different features of distribution in a society. 
The remainder of Table 5 presents the results of the parametric decompositions, 
namely 
P
r θ  and 
J
r θ , for J set to equal each individual circumstance variable in our 
partition: gender, ethnicity, father’s occupation, father’s education, mother’s education 
and birthplace.
30 Still focusing on the path-independent measure E(0), the parametric 
                                                 
28 The differences between Ecuador and Peru, as well as between Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, or Brazil, 
Colombia and Panama, are insignificant at the 5% level, on the basis of the bootstrapped standard errors. 
29 The opportunity shares tend to be somewhat higher for the Theil index (E(1)); and much lower for E(2). 
In the case of the latter, this is due in part to its greater sensitivity to income gaps at the top of the 
distribution. Notice also that the path-dependence is most pronounces for E(2), given the squaring of 
relative means built into its weighting scheme for the within-group component. See footnote 13. 
30 As discussed in Section 3, these indices are based on the OLS estimates of equation (7). The reduced-
form estimates for all six countries are presented in Table 6. All coefficients have the expected signs and 
most are quite strong. Since this is a reduced-form equation, these coefficients can not be interpreted 
causally, and capture both the partial direct effects of C on y, and indirect effects through E. As noted   19
approach yields systematically lower (overall) opportunity shares of inequality, ranging 
from 17% in Colombia to 34% in Brazil. This is true in all countries, although the 
difference between 
N
r θ  and 
P
r θ   is only approximately 3% (and statistically insignificant) 
in the case of Brazil. The differences are larger, but either borderline significant or 
insignificant at the 5% level, in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru. The country 
ranking is identical for the two estimation procedures. 
These systematic differences are consistent with the expectation (discussed in 
Section 3) that the large sampling variance within cells with very few observations may 
cause an upward bias in the non-parametric estimates. Although it can not be ruled out 
that the (linear) functional form assumption implicit in the parametric estimate might lead 
to underestimates, the fact that in the only country for which we have a substantially 
larger sample size (Brazil) the difference almost vanishes provides some support for the 
suspicion that the bias might come from the sampling variance in small cells in the non-
parametric estimates. Nevertheless, given the remaining uncertainty, we make two 
recommendations: (i) wherever possible, surveys that may be used for measuring 
inequality of opportunity should collect larger sample sizes; and (ii) where that is not 
possible, both parametric and non-parametric estimates should be reported to provide a 
plausible range for the true lower-bound value of inequality of opportunity. 
Regarding the effect of each individual circumstance, 
J
r Θ  is highest for family 
background variables in all countries. This is particularly true for mother’s education 
which is associated with between 9% and 12% of total inequality. The relative shares of 
inequalities associated with ethnicity and place of birth vary across countries, with 
ethnicity being more important in Brazil, Guatemala, and Panama – where it accounts for 
between 3% and 7% of inequalities – and the geography of birth having more effect in 
Peru, Brazil and Panama, where it accounts for 4-6% of overall inequality. Finally, 
inequality of opportunity related to gender ranges from a low of 0-1% in Panama and 
Colombia, to a high of 5% in Guatemala. In Brazil and Ecuador, gender accounts for 3-
4% of overall inequality. 
                                                                                                                                                 
earlier, labor market participation is almost 100% for men in this age group, but much lower for women. As 
implied by the reduced-form specification, we are estimating inequality of earnings opportunities 
conditional on being active in the labor market, so it would be inappropriate to correct for selection.   20
 
6.  Inequality in Opportunity for Household Welfare  
 
Earnings are a key component of family incomes, and an important source of 
individual status, self-esteem and bargaining power but, as a measure of individual well-
being, it would be seriously incomplete. Total household income (or consumption 
expenditure) per capita are better measures of welfare, because they account for incomes 
from other sources (such as capital incomes or transfers) and for resource pooling within 
the household. Unless access to public and publicly provided goods (such as public safety 
and free public education or health care, respectively) is taken into account, household 
income or consumption expenditures are also incomplete and partial measures of welfare. 
Still, they are better measures than earnings and, for many countries, they are the best 
available indicators of individual welfare available.
31   
Figure 2 depicts the conditional distributions of consumption per capita for 
circumstance groups defined according to mother’s education (in Panel A) and ethnicity 
(in Panel B), analogously to Figure 1 for earnings. In Panel A, the consumption distances 
between groups defined by mother’s education are larger than the corresponding earnings 
gaps (shown in Figure 1) for all five countries, and largest for Guatemala and Panama. 
Panel B exhibits greater variation across countries, with large gaps between ethnic groups 
in Guatemala and Panama, much more limited (or insignificant) distances in Colombia, 
and an intermediate pattern in Ecuador and Peru.
32 
Tables 7 and 8 present our relative measures of inequality of opportunity for 
household income and consumption expenditures per capita, respectively. These tables 
are analogous to Table 5 (for earnings), and report 
N
d θ , 
N
r θ , 
P
r θ  and 
J
r Θ  for E(0, 1 and 
2), along with bootstrapped standard errors taking into account sampling weights, 
stratification and clustering. Gender is excluded from the set of circumstance variables 
since these indicators are defined at the level of the household, and the gender of the 
                                                 
31 There are two other steps in the mapping from household income or consumption to individual welfare 
which we overlook here, by using income or consumption per capita. First, we make an extreme 
assumption about the (in)existence of economies of scale in consumption within the household. Second, we 
assume that household resources are shared equally, which they may well not be.  
32 Recall that there is no data for consumption in Brazil’s PNAD survey.   21
household head is endogenous (and thus not a circumstance).
33 We therefore work with 
five circumstances (race, father’s and mother’s education, father’s occupation, and birth 
place). Income results are reported for all six countries, but consumption data was not 
available in the PNAD data (for Brazil). Table 8 contains estimates of inequality of 
opportunity for consumption for Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru. 
Tables 9 and 10 report the OLS coefficients of the reduced-form equation (7), for income 
and consumption expenditures respectively (analogously to Table 6).
34 
In our samples, overall household income inequality is higher than earnings 
inequality in Brazil and Panama (by all measures) and in Colombia (by E(1) and E(2), but 
not by E(0)). It is lower than earnings inequality in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru (by all 
measures), and in Colombia by E(0). In all five countries for which consumption data is 
available, consumption inequality is considerably lower than either income or earnings 
inequality. This is consistent with the widespread view that income (and earnings, when 
these include agricultural and informal sector earnings) is measured with greater error 
than consumption expenditures, as well as with the expectation that consumption is likely 
to be closer than current income to permanent income (provided households have access 
to some consumption-smoothing mechanisms).
35 
  Focusing once again on the path-independent measure E(0), non-parametric 
estimates of inequality of opportunity for household incomes range from 25% (in 
Colombia) to 37% (in Guatemala). As for earnings, the parametric estimates are slightly 
lower: from 23% in Colombia to 35% in Guatemala. For both estimation procedures, the 
indices are higher than the corresponding estimates for earnings in all countries except 
for Brazil, where the difference is quite small: 34% for earnings versus 32% for income 
per capita (for the parametric estimates). In addition to earnings capacity, pre-determined 
circumstances affect another three important household income determinants: other 
incomes (such as capital incomes or transfers); the choice of one’s partner; and the 
composition of the rest of the household (including, most importantly, the number of 
                                                 
33 Endogeneity arises both because in some countries reported headship is an interviewee choice, and 
because household formation (e.g. whether or not one marries) is endogenous. 
34 All coefficients in these reduced-form regressions have the expected signs, and most are significant at the 
1% level. Coefficient sizes are consistent with a reduced-form specification. 
35 See, e.g. Deaton, 1997, on both of these reasons to prefer consumption to income data in assessing the 
distribution of welfare in developing countries.   22
children). The pattern found in the data suggests that inequality of opportunities in these 
three domains tends to reinforce the inequality of opportunities that operates through the 
earnings channel in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama and Peru; but to partially 
offset them in Brazil. 
  While total inequality is lower in the distribution of consumption expenditures 
than in the income distribution, the opposite is true for estimates of inequality of 
opportunity. The (E(0)) opportunity shares of inequality reported in Table 8 are 
considerably higher than those reported in Table 7 for all five countries, and regardless of 
whether the estimates are parametric or non-parametric. The differences are in the 20-
30% range for Ecuador, Panama and Peru, 40% for Guatemala, but only 6% for 
Colombia. This supports the notion that income-based measures of inequality of 
opportunity tend to underestimate lifetime (or permanent income) inequality of 
opportunity, since transitory income variance (and likely higher measurement error) is 
effectively counted as inequality due to “efforts and luck”.
36 Our non-parametric 
(parametric) estimates of inequality of opportunity in the distribution of consumption 
expenditures are: 27% (24%) in Colombia, 34% (32%) in Ecuador, 35% (34%) in Peru, 
42% (39%) in Panama, and 52% (50%) in Guatemala.
37  
Figure 3 graphically depicts the decomposition of household consumption 
inequality into the lower-bound inequality of opportunity and a residual term, associated 
with effort differences and luck, for both the parametric and the (path-independent) non-
parametric method. Despite the sample size limitations (especially for Panama and 
Guatemala), the parametric and non-parametric estimates turn out to be very close. These 
differences are smaller for consumption inequality than for earnings, reflecting larger 
sample sizes, and thus a lower proportion of cells with zero or few observations (see 
Table 4). Although the parametric estimates remain systematically below their non-
parametric counterparts, the differences are now never statistically significant, and the 
country ranking is identical. 
                                                 
36 See Bourguignon et al. (2007) for a discussion. The finding is analogous to the well-known fact that 
inter-generational mobility estimates are much higher when based on single-period wages for parents and 
children, than when based on longer earnings histories. See, inter alia, Solon (1999) and Mazumder (2005). 
37 With the exception of the difference between Ecuador and Peru, all cross country differences are 
significant at the 5% level, on the basis of the bootstrapped standard errors.   23
Figure 3 also provides an intuitive illustration of the distinction between the 
absolute-Θ measures of inequality of opportunity (defined in equation 4) and the relative-
Θ measures (defined in equation 5). The level of E(0) corresponding to (either the 
parametric or the non-parametric) estimate of inequality of opportunity (the lower part of 
the bar in Figure 3) is an example of the absolute measures  { } + ℜ →
k
i y : θ , 




i y IB y = θ . The ratio of this lower segment to the height of the entire bar yields an 
example of the relative measures:  { } [ ] 1 , 0 : →
k
i y θ ,  {} () { } ( )





i = θ . 
Turning to the analysis of individual circumstance variables, we find that family 
background characteristics are once again associated with the largest share of inequality 
of opportunity. The share of inequality accounted for by mother’s education alone is 
higher than 15% in most countries, and as high as 26% in Guatemala. The share of 
inequality associated with the other variables is usually higher than for earnings, with the 
same broad ranking across different circumstances (parental background more important 
than either race or birth region). The higher levels of inequality of opportunity observed 
in Central American countries, however, are associated with larger partial shares for 
region of birth (which is also important in Peru) and ethnicity. 
 
7.  The Opportunity-deprivation Profile: Identifying the Least Advantaged 
Groups 
 
The analysis has so far focused on scalar measures of inequality of opportunity in 
each country, largely expressed as shares of total outcome inequality. These indices can 
be useful to summarize the importance of a set of predetermined circumstances in the 
structure of inequality in a particular country. Since the relative measures are not closely 
correlated with measures of outcome inequality, they are also informative of some of the 
differences in the nature of inequality across countries. Ultimately, a country where a 
smaller share of total inequality is associated with differences in opportunity is likely to 
be a fairer society, where individual choices and effort (and luck) play a greater role in 
determining outcomes than family origin, race or gender.   24
However, the partition of the population { }
k
i y  into K types, which is undertaken to 
generate these indices, can also be used to yield a byproduct of potentially even greater 
interest to analysts and policymakers alike. Recall that each cell in the partition 
corresponds to a Roemerian type  k i i k ∈ Τ : , such that  K k k i C C
k k
i ,..., 1 , = ∈ ⇔ = . We 
have seen that equal opportunities attain when  ( ) ( ) l k y F y F l k ≠ ∀ = , , which is a different 
way of writing  () () y F C y F =  for a discrete partition. Differences in the outcome 
distributions among types therefore are taken to reveal (or arise from) inequality of 
opportunity.  
At least conceptually, it is not unreasonable to see  ( ) y Fk  as an individual i’s  
( k i∈ ) opportunity set for outcome y. Given i’s circumstances 
k
i C , only i’s own choices, 
efforts and luck will determine his final position,  ( ) i k i y F p = . If it were possible, 
therefore, to rank  () y Fk  across k in a meaningful way, we would obtain a ranking of 
opportunity sets across types, which we call an opportunity profile. 
As previously discussed, one obvious such ranking would be given by any (first- 
or second-order) stochastic dominance relationships between types. However, the 
stochastic dominance approach to constructing an opportunity profile suffers from two 
problems. The first, which is conceptual in nature, is that any such ranking is perforce 
partial and incomplete (see Atkinson, 1970). The second, which is practical in nature, is 
that the distribution of cell sizes partly summarized in Table 4 makes it impossible to 
estimate the conditional distributions for the full set of 54 – 216 types in our partitions.  
Albeit conceptually less satisfactory, a feasible alternative ranking algorithm 
would be to use a particular moment of  ( ) y Fk , such as the mean, or indeed  a particular 
percentile, such as the median, the first quartile, etc. Because the type’s mean outcome, 
k μ , was central in constructing smoothed and standardized distributions, and thus for the 
decomposition exercises reported in Sections 5 and 6, we choose to use it as the ranking 
criterion for the type-specific opportunity sets  ( ) y Fk  in what follows. While this strikes 
us as a reasonable choice, it is still arbitrary, and the reader is cautioned that alternative 
criteria are certainly possible, and might imply different rankings.   25
Furthermore, we choose to focus only on the least-advantaged types in a society – 
those with the lowest-ranking opportunity sets. We avoid the issue of setting an 
“opportunity deprivation threshold”, and choose simply to consider the types that account 
for the bottom 10% of the population. In other words, we rank all types in each country in 
increasing order of mean outcome. The bottom m groups are included in that country’s 
opportunity profile, where the population share over m sums to 10%. Formally, these are 
the  m groups k = 1,…, m such that: 
j m μ μ μ μ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ...








, where N  is the overall population size. We refer to the set of types 
() {} m k k ,..., 1 ∈  as the opportunity-deprivation profile; and to the individuals i that belong 
to those types as the opportunity-deprived. 
Table A1 in the appendix lists the full opportunity-deprivation profiles for each of 
our six countries, described by the specific circumstances that define them (ethnicity, 
mother’s and father’s education levels, father’s occupation and birthplace). It also reports 
their population sizes and shares, as well as their mean per capita consumption (in levels 
and as shares of the national means).
38 The number of types in the opportunity-
deprivation profile varies across countries: There are 5 such groups in Guatemala and 
Peru, 6 in Brazil, 10 in Colombia, 16 in Ecuador, 20 in Mexico, and 25 in Panama. Some 
types represent large populations (there are two groups in the Brazilian profile that 
represent more than 2 million people each) while others represent only a few hundred 
individuals.  
When presented in their “full” form, as in Table A1, opportunity-deprivation 
profiles are simply a list of the types with the lowest-ranking opportunity sets in each 
country in our sample. For comparative purposes, however, it may be useful to have a 
synthetic overview of the opportunity-deprived group as a whole, in each country. Table 
11 thus summarizes a number of characteristics of all opportunity-deprived individuals in 
our six countries. Three common traits are salient. First, members of ethnic minorities 
form the vast majority of the population in these disadvantaged groups. In three of our six 
countries, these groups are composed exclusively of members of racial or ethnic 
                                                 
38 It is of course possible to construct similar profiles for each of our three concepts of economic advantage, 
but we report one only for household consumption per capita. Per capita income is used for Brazil.   26
minorities: black and mixed-race in Brazil; and native speakers of indigenous languages 
in Guatemala and Peru. In two other countries, ethnic minorities are still a majority of the 
opportunity-deprived: 76% of the opportunity profile in Panama consists of native 
speakers of indigenous languages; and 61% of self-reported indigenous, black or mixed-
race ethnicity in Ecuador. Colombia is the only country in our sample where ethnic 
minorities are not the majority among the opportunity-deprived but, even there, the 
proportion of minorities, 33%, is still higher than in the population as a whole.  
Second, family background is also strongly associated with opportunity-
deprivation. In the four countries where this information is available, never fewer than 
83% of the opportunity-deprived are daughters and sons of agricultural workers, and this 
proportion reaches 100% in Guatemala. Almost the same holds for parental education: In 
all countries, more than 90% of the opportunity-deprived are daughters and sons of 
women who did not go to school – 99% in Guatemala and Peru, 98% in Ecuador, 96% in 
Colombia, 93% in Panama, and 91% in Brazil. Similar results hold for father’s education, 
although in Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, father’s education is a less powerful 
predictor of opportunity deprivation than mother’s education. 
Third, opportunity deprivation is remarkably spatially concentrated. A majority of 
the opportunity-deprived are often natives of the same specific regions. In Brazil, all 
persons in our profile were born in the Northeast or North regions; in Colombia, 99% hail 
from peripheral departments; in Guatemala, 99% come from one of the North and North-
western departments; in Panama, 96% were born in a rural area.
39 There is somewhat 
greater spatial heterogeneity in the opportunity-deprivation profiles for Ecuador and Peru. 
Does opportunity deprivation manifest itself in lower economic achievement 
levels? Qualitatively the answer is “yes” by construction, since the types were ranked by 
mean economic achievement. Quantitatively, the last row in Table 11 gives the income 
share of the opportunity deprived in each country. Since they account for 10% of the 
population in all countries by construction, the distance between their income (or 
consumption expenditure) share and 10% can be seen as a rough quantitative measure of 
the economic consequences of opportunity deprivation in each country. The income share 
                                                 
39 Geographical regions are not reported in the survey for Panama, so an urban-rural subdivision was used 
instead.   27
of the 10% of the population we classify as opportunity deprived is 2,7% in Panama, 
2.9% in Brazil, 3.5% in Guatemala, and 4.4% in Ecuador, 4.8%  Peru, and 5.0% in 
Colombia.
40  
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the differences between the 
opportunity-deprivation profile we have introduced, and the more standard concept of a 
poverty profile. A poverty profile describes the characteristics of individuals with 
individual incomes below a poverty line, whereas the opportunity profile ranks 
individuals by the mean income (or consumption) of the type they belong to. These are 
conceptually very different objects. An opportunity-deprivation profile will include 
individuals from very disadvantaged backgrounds, who happened to be successful and 
have escaped poverty through their own efforts or sheer luck. A poverty profile will not. 
An opportunity-deprivation profile will exclude individuals from more advantaged 
backgrounds, who did poorly either through bad luck or poor performance, whereas a 
poverty profile will include them.  
Differences between the two profiles may, therefore, contain information on how 
powerful circumstances are in determining poverty outcomes. If there is very little 
difference, effort and luck would appear to be largely powerless to compensate for the 
initial opportunity deprivation individuals inherit. Conversely, if there is limited overlap 
between the two profiles, one could claim that initial circumstances matter little to a 
person’s chances of escaping poverty. Table 12 describes the poverty profile for our six 
countries, by arbitrarily fixing the poverty line at the first decile in each distribution. In 
this fashion both profiles refer to the “bottom” 10% of the population, with the difference 
arising from the ranking criterion used to define “bottom”.   
The comparison of the two profiles reveals interesting patterns. Unsurprisingly, 
the opportunity-deprived are more homogenous than the poor with respect to most 
circumstance variables. Although ethnic minorities form the majority of the opportunity-
deprived in five countries (and 100% in Brazil, Guatemala and Peru) they account for 
lower shares of the poor: 70% in Guatemala, 69% in Brazil, 56% in Peru, 54% in 
                                                 
40 One can also isolate the types that account for the top end of the opportunity profile in each country. Call 
them “opportunity hoarders”. Their income shares are 22.6% in Panama, 23.1% in Ecuador, 23.7% in Peru, 
25.8% in Colombia, 28.8% in Brazil, and 29.3% in Guatemala. Details of the “opportunity-hoarding” 
profile for our six countries is available from the authors on request.   28
Panama, 32% in Ecuador, and 15% in Colombia. A similar pattern arises for place of 
birth: poverty is less spatially concentrated than economic opportunity: 70% of the poor 
in Brazil live in the North or Northeast (as compared with 100% of the opportunity-
deprived being born there). 65% of the poor live in Colombia’s peripheral departments, 
while 99% of the opportunity-deprived were born there. And so on. Family backgrounds 
are also more heterogeneous among the poor than among the opportunity deprived, 
although the share of children of agricultural workers is still very high at 80% in Ecuador 
and Panama, and 75% in Guatemala.  
  The last row in Table 12, analogously to Table 11, provides the income share of 
the poor in each country. They are 0.7% in Brazil (using income per capita), 1.5% in 
Colombia and Panama, 1.8% in Guatemala and Peru, and 1.9% in Ecuador. The ratio of 
the income share of the opportunity-deprived to the income share of the poor is 1.80 in 
Panama; 1.94 in Guatemala; 2.31 in Ecuador; 2.66 in Peru, 3.33; in Colombia; and 4.14 
in Brazil.
41 Since the income share of the opportunity-deprived is larger when some 
among them succeed in escaping poverty, these ratios are suggestive indicators of 
“mobility”. The higher the ratio, the less opportunity-deprivation would seem to amount 
to a sentence of life in poverty, delivered at birth. Nevertheless, more confident 
statements on the relationship between opportunity-deprivation profiles, poverty profiles, 
and more standard measures of mobility (which largely rely on the association between 






This paper has proposed a simple conceptual framework for the measurement of 
inequality of opportunity, which derives two empirical tools directly from John Roemer’s 
theory of equal opportunities. The first tool is a class of scalar indices that measure 
                                                 
41 The number for Brazil is not comparable to those of the other countries, since it is built on an income, 
rather than consumption expenditure, distribution.  
42 Van de Gaer et al. (2001) contain a pioneering theoretical discussion of the relationship between mobility 
and equality of opportunity. See also Gaviria (2007) for a recent survey of intergenerational mobility in 
Latin America, with some discussion of attitudes to redistribution. Fields et al. (2007) provide a survey of 
the evidence on intra-generational income mobility in the region.    29
inequality of opportunity as the share (or level) of overall inequality in a given population 
which exists between social groups defined by different initial circumstances (rather than 
within these groups). The indices are inspired by the observation that, if opportunities 
were equally distributed, outcomes would be orthogonal to pre-determined morally 
irrelevant circumstances, so that the between-type inequality share would be zero. 
Because not all relevant circumstances are observed, the indices provide a lower-bound 
estimate of inequality of opportunity. 
Indices belonging to this class may differ along three dimensions: the inequality 
aversion parameter in the underlying inequality measure; the path of the decomposition, 
and the nature of the estimation procedure. We show that if we restrict our attention to 
path-independent decomposable inequality indices, the class collapses to a unique index, 
which can be estimated either parametrically or non-parametrically. The proposed 
parametric estimation procedure is a useful complement to the simple non-parametric 
decomposition both for data-efficiency reasons, and to estimate partial, circumstance-
specific indices. 
The second empirical tool is an opportunity-deprivation profile: the list of 
Roemerian types (i.e. social groups that share identical circumstances) that account for 
the lowest-ranked p% of the population, when types are ranked by their mean advantage 
levels.
43 The profile identifies the types with the lowest-ranked opportunity sets in 
society. If followed over time, they would allow a practical application of Roemer’s 
(2006) suggestion that economic development might be measured by the rate of progress 
of the worst-off type.  
We applied these concepts to a rich data set for six countries in Latin America, 
whose surveys contained information on a number of relevant pre-determined, morally 
irrelevant circumstances, namely: gender, race or ethnicity, birthplace, mother’s and 
father’s education, and father’s occupation. We calculated our unique path-independent 
measure of inequality of opportunity both parametrically and non-parametrically, for the 
distributions or earnings, household per capita income, and household per capita 
consumption expenditure. As expected, the non-parametric method tended to 
                                                 
43 We set p%=10%, and used consumption expenditure per capita as our indicator of economic advantage 
(except for Brazil, where income per capita was used instead).   30
systematically overstate inequality of opportunity when sample sizes were small. For 
larger samples, and in particular when using household income or consumption per capita 
as indicators of advantage, the two estimates were numerically close and the differences 
between them were statistically insignificant, generating a robust lower-bound estimate 
of inequality of opportunity.  
For labor earnings, the (parametric) estimates ranged from 17% of total inequality 
in Colombia, to 34% in Brazil. For household income per capita, the range was between 
23% in Colombia to 35% in Guatemala. For consumption expenditures, the range was 
between 24% in Colombia, and 50% in Guatemala. Differences between the indices for 
the distribution of earnings and those for household welfare are due both to differences in 
the extent of measurement error, and to differences in the mechanisms through which 
circumstances affect outcomes (e.g. family formation, labor force participation, etc.) In 
all cases, family background – proxied for by parental education levels and the father’s 
occupation – was the largest component of the opportunity share of inequality, although 
ethnicity was also important in Brazil, Guatemala and Panama.  
The opportunity profiles provide an X-ray of the opportunity structures in Latin 
America, at least for those social groups with the most limited opportunity sets in these 
six countries. These “opportunity-deprived” types were overwhelmingly members of 
ethnic minorities, and tended to hail from agricultural families with low levels of 
education, living in poor regions. A comparison of their income shares with those of the 
poorest 10% of the population in each country reveals that, as expected, many of those 
with limited initial opportunities do manage to move out of poverty, while others – from 
more advantaged backgrounds – fall into poverty. Yet, in no country did the 10% most 
opportunity-deprived people account for more than 5% of total consumption expenditure. 
In Brazil and Panama, the figure was less than 3%.  
Both the scalar indices - which reveal that the lower-bound for the share of 
consumption inequality which is due entirely to factors beyond the individuals control is 
of the order of 30% to 50% - and the opportunity-deprivation profiles - which document 
the enduring “costs” of being born of certain races, in certain places and to certain 
families – suggest that unequal opportunities are an important source of the outcome   31
differences we observe in Latin America. This is a part of inequality that can not be 
explained as a return to effort, or even as the result of random shocks and pure luck.  
In this paper, we have sought to lay the foundation for the measurement of 
inequality of opportunity, relating it to the relevant economic theory. It would be 
interesting for future work to investigate at least two aspects of these findings: first, how 
do our comparisons of opportunity-deprivation and poverty profiles relate to more 
standard measures of intergenerational mobility? Second, do differences among countries 
in the nature (e.g. in the opportunity share) – rather than merely in the level – of 
inequality, affect social and political attitudes, the nature of redistribution systems, and 
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Table 1: Survey names, dates and sample sizes 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
          
Survey  PNAD 1996  ECV 2003  ECV 2006  ENCOVI 2000  ENV 2003  ENAHO 2001 
          
Sample selection 
criteria 
30-49 head or 
spouse 
30-49  30-49 30-49 30-49  30-49  head 
or spouse 




50,560  16,575  9,671 4,661 4,127  9,830 
(share of original 
sample) 




71,688 22,436  12,643  6,865  5,653 13,649 
(share of original 
sample) 
0.837 0.996  0.999 0.984 0.889  0.979 
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Table 2: Definition of circumstance variables 
  BRAZIL  COLOMBIA  ECUADOR  GUATEMALA  PANAMA  PERU 
           
Ethnicity           
category 1  self reported white 
ethnicity 
Other self-reported  ethnicity: 
white, mixed blood 
(“mestizo”) or other 
European maternal 
language 
 European  maternal 
language 
category 2  self reported black 





gitano, archipiélago o 
palenquero” 
self-reported ethnicity:  
indigenous, black 







         
Father's occupation         
category 1  agricultural worker  Missing  agricultural worker or 
domestic worker 
agricultural worker  agricultural worker  missing 
category 2  Other    Other  other other  
         
Mother’s and father’s 
education 
      
 
category 1  None or unknown  none or unknown  none or unknown  none or unknown  none or unknown  none or unknown 
category 2  completed grade 1 
to 4 
primary incomplete  Primary  primary incomplete primary  primary  incomplete 
category 3  completed grade 5 
or more 
primary complete or 
more 
secondary or more  primary complete or 
more 
secondary or more  primary complete or 
more 
         
Birth region         
category 1  Sao Paulo & 
Federal district 
departments at the 
periphery 











category 2  South East, Center-
West & South 
Central 
departments(a) 
Costa & Insular 
provinces 
North & North-West 
departments 
other urban centers  Southern and other 
costal departments 
category 3  North-East, North or 
missing 
Bogota, San Andres 
and Providencia 
islands and foreign 
country 
Pichincha province 
(with Quito) & Azuay 
province 
South-East, South-
West & Center 
departments 
rural areas  Arequipa, Callao & 
Lima 
(a) Central departments are Boyaca, Caldas, Caqueta, Cundinamarca, Huila, Meta, Norte de Santander, Quindio, Risaralda, Santander, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca.  36
Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
 
a.  Circumstances 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
            
Gender            
male  47.4 46.4  48.8  47.2  48.5  47.6 
female  52.6 53.6  51.2  52.8  51.5  52.4 
            
Ethnicity            
majority  59.8 90.8  88.3  69.3  92.2  72.3 
minority  40.2 9.2  11.7  30.7  7.8  27.7 
            
Father's occupation             
agricultural worker  35.0 missing  51.9  49.5  37.1  missing 
other  65.0   48.1 50.5  62.9   
            
Father's education             
none or unknown  50.2 36.2  27.9  67.3  21.7  30.9 
primary  40.2 49.0  56.1  17.3  54.2  32.1 
primary complete / secondary  9.7 14.8  16.1  15.5 24.1  37.0 
            
Mother's education             
none  or unknown  53.1 31.7  29.3  76.8  24.5  48.7 
primary  37.9 53.9  56.4  12.2  54.5  24.9 
primary complete / secondary  9.0 14.4  14.4  11.0 21.1  26.4 
            
Birth region             
Region 1  17.6 45.1  31.3  27.5  30.4  45.4 
Region 2  47.1 45.8  50.6  20.9  21.1  35.7 
Region 3  35.3 9.1  18.1  51.6 48.5  18.8 
 
b.  Economic outcomes 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
           
Currency unit 











           
Individual earnings  905.8  544,800 341.4  1,734.2  477.0  809.9 
 [1,460.1]  [838,400]  [516.2]  [4,195.4] [620.0]  [1,542.9] 
Per capita total   391.9  329,300  199.0  667.0  255.3  376.8 
household income  [708.2]  [546,400]  [256.1] [1,237.6]  [376.2] [682.9] 
           
Per capita     341000  123.0  603.5  180.3  307.4 
consumption   [485,300]  [131.8]  [701.8] [187.5]  [353.2] 
Means and standard deviations for economic outcomes in the population. Sources: all six surveys, samples for analysis of per 
capita income.   37
Table 4: Description of the disaggregation of the population into circumstances cells 
 
a.  Samples for earnings analysis 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
            
Maximum number of 
groups  216 108 216  216  216  108 
            
Actual number of groups  214  105  193  172  147  102 
            
Mean number of 
observations per group  236.3 150.2  50.1  27.1  28.1 96.4 
            
Proportion of groups 
with fewer than 5 
observations 
0.08 0.14 0.33  0.41  0.44  0.11 
 
 
b.  Samples for income and consumption analysis 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
           
Maximum number of 
groups  108 54  108  108 108 54 
           
Number of groups 
observed  108 54  102  96  84  53 
           
Mean number of 
observations per group  663.8 394.8  124  71.5  67.7  257.5 
           
Proportion of groups 
with fewer than 5 
observations 
0.06  0.06 0.17  0.23 0.30  0.08   38
Table 5: Inequality of Opportunity Indices for Labor Earnings 
   B RAZIL   C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
  E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) 
                                                
TOTAL INEQUALITY  0.616  0.637 1.271 0.608  0.583 1.184 0.638  0.587 1.262 0.786  0.790 2.927 0.572  0.485 0.843 0.675  0.679 1.814 
   0.009  0.014 0.086 0.023  0.037 0.189 0.020  0.027 0.151 0.047  0.071 0.990 0.027  0.037 0.167 0.023  0.036 0.367 
                                
NON PARAMETRIC 
ESTIMATES  
                            
N
d θ   0.349  0.341 0.209 0.203  0.235 0.144 0.256  0.284 0.158 0.293  0.314 0.116 0.245  0.266 0.161 0.212  0.220 0.095 
  0.008  0.010 0.015 0.021  0.024 0.015 0.016  0.021 0.027 0.029  0.038 0.081 0.024  0.026 0.026 0.018  0.019 0.024 
N
r θ    0.349  0.322 0.344 0.203  0.258 0.411 0.256  0.314 0.498 0.293  0.353 0.516 0.245  0.272 0.396 0.212  0.227 0.000 
   0.008  0.013 0.040 0.021  0.038 0.080 0.016  0.027 0.063 0.029  0.048 0.184 0.024  0.042 0.088 0.018  0.038 0.326 
                                
PARAMETRIC 
ESTIMATES 
                                  
P
r θ   0.338  0.295 0.247 0.170  0.197 0.319 0.214  0.237 0.381 0.231  0.227 0.045 0.174  0.148 0.159 0.174  0.105 0 
   0.009  0.020 0.132 0.022  0.046 0.115 0.017  0.028 0.061 0.028  0.066 0.674 0.026  0.044 0.085 0.021  0.075 1.098 
J
r θ  
                         
    
  Gender  0.036  0.018 0 0.003  0 0  0.026  0 0  0.054  0.033 0.031  0  0 0.012  0.019  0 0 
   0.005  0.011 0.056 0.008  0.019 0.067 0.016  0.038 0.174 0.023  0.046 0.278 0.012  0.029 0.085 0.007  0.017 0.101 
                                 
Race  0.074  0.067 0.070 0.001  0.001 0.002 0.008  0.010 0.017 0.032  0.038 0.073 0.031  0.020 0.031 0.023  0.021 0 
   0.004  0.006 0.025 0.002  0.003 0.005 0.003  0.004 0.007 0.008  0.009 0.015 0.007  0.005 0.006 0.007  0.010 0.073 
                                 
Father's occupation  0.068  0.058 0.062     (a)   0.061  0.061 0 0.016  0.019 0.043 0.057  0.042 0     (a)  
   0.003  0.005 0.019        0.009  0.016 0.075 0.006  0.009 0.026 0.013  0.031 0.127       
                                 
Father's education  0.110  0.113 0.162 0.102  0.140 0.242 0.074  0.101 0.187 0.086  0.110 0.195 0.069  0.076 0.069 0.074  0.060 0 
   0.005  0.008 0.024 0.017  0.028 0.061 0.013  0.018 0.043 0.022  0.039 0.154 0.018  0.024 0.057 0.013  0.020 0.106 
                                 
Mother's education  0.123  0.127 0.187 0.104  0.144 0.245 0.094  0.127 0.230 0.092  0.115 0.224 0.099  0.109 0.118 0.098  0.106 0.042 
   0.006  0.009 0.025 0.019  0.029 0.059 0.013  0.019 0.047 0.020  0.039 0.157 0.020  0.027 0.054 0.013  0.021 0.125 
                                 
Birth region  0.052  0.035 0.021 0.017  0.006 0.000 0.015  0.017 0.000 0.025  0.036 0.103 0.056  0.060 0.093 0.044  0.055 0.052 
   0.005  0.007 0.025 0.010  0.020 0.062 0.008  0.015 0.047 0.014  0.022 0.086 0.015  0.021 0.040 0.011  0.019 0.057 
   Sample individuals 30-49 with positive labor earnings and information on a set of circumstances; standard errors in italics; (a) father’s occupation is missing for Colombia and Peru.  39
Table 6:  Reduced-Form OLS Regression of Earnings on Observed Circumstances. 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA ECUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
            
Female -0.589***  -0.487***  -0.799***  -1.028***  -0.399***  -0.638*** 
 [0.009]  [0.028]  [0.030]  [0.060] [0.042]  [0.032] 
            
Member of an ethnic minority  -0.364***  -0.009 -0.111***  -0.261***  -0.758***  -0.175*** 
 [0.009]  [0.043]  [0.038]  [0.059] [0.101]  [0.036] 
            
Father agricultural worker  -0.366***    -0.322***  -0.090  -0.320***   
 [0.009]    [0.031]  [0.056]  [0.046]   
            
Father primary education  0.206***  0.204***  0.103***  0.174***  0.125*  0.240*** 
 [0.011]  [0.032]  [0.035]  [0.069] [0.065]  [0.042] 
            
Father secondary education  0.559***  0.600***  0.420***  0.396***  0.369***  0.456*** 
 [0.019]  [0.057]  [0.058]  [0.121] [0.079]  [0.049] 
            
Mother primary education  0.243***  0.220*** 0.291***  0.349***  0.303*** 0.165*** 
 [0.011]  [0.033]  [0.035]  [0.097] [0.063]  [0.041] 
            
Mother secondary education  0.644***  0.608***  0.634***  0.689***  0.603***  0.486*** 
 [0.019]  [0.061]  [0.059]  [0.125] [0.081]  [0.051] 
            
Birth region 2  -0.353***  0.197***  -0.183***  -0.195**  -0.008  0.076** 
 [0.013]  [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.077] [0.056]  [0.033] 
            
Birth region 3  -0.597***  0.427***  0.133***  -0.245***  -0.287***  0.365*** 
 [0.015]  [0.047]  [0.041]  [0.070] [0.058]  [0.042] 
            
Constant 6.450***  12.262***  5.084***  7.005***  5.263***  6.709*** 
 [0.014]  [0.032]  [0.034]  [0.075] [0.079]  [0.038] 
            
Observations 50560  16575  9259  4661  4127  9830 
R-squared 0.35  0.15  0.20 0.22  0.22 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Omitted categories are: male, ethnic majority, father and mother with no or unknown education, and 
birth region 1 (see Table 2 for the country-specific definitions). 
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Table 7: Inequality of Opportunity Indices for Household Income (per capita) 
   B RAZIL   C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
   E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) 
                               
TOTAL INEQUALITY  0.695  0.710 1.595 0.559  0.626 1.377 0.417  0.452 0.828 0.619  0.683 1.722 0.630  0.609 1.085 0.557  0.635 1.642 
   0.009  0.015 0.152 0.027  0.038 0.141 0.017  0.027 0.108 0.035  0.040 0.320 0.032  0.037 0.105 0.024  0.041 0.222 
                                
NON PARAMETRIC 
ESTIMATES  
                            
N
d θ   0.329  0.337 0.191 0.250  0.261 0.157 0.290  0.287 0.187 0.373  0.386 0.209 0.346  0.335 0.213 0.292  0.271 0.124 
  0.008  0.010 0.015 0.020  0.021 0.013 0.020  0.022 0.024 0.032  0.040 0.061 0.023  0.025 0.024 0.019  0.017 0.016 
N
r θ   0.329  0.319 0.416 0.250  0.287 0.397 0.290  0.315 0.421 0.373  0.419 0.587 0.346  0.322 0.304 0.292  0.337 0.418 
   0.008  0.014 0.054 0.020  0.033 0.068 0.020  0.026 0.047 0.032  0.035 0.079 0.023  0.037 0.098 0.019  0.033 0.125 
                                
PARAMETRIC 
ESTIMATES 
                            
P
r θ   0.322  0.305 0.382 0.233  0.259 0.350 0.269  0.284 0.365 0.345  0.371 0.498 0.315  0.274 0.233 0.279  0.302 0.321 
   0.009  0.016 0.065 0.019  0.034 0.083 0.020  0.027 0.055 0.031  0.041 0.108 0.022  0.039 0.113 0.018  0.030 0.135 
J
r θ                                 
Race  0.086  0.079 0.107  0  0 0.001  0.022  0.020 0.028 0.082  0.077 0.102 0.066  0.036 0.037 0.044  0.038 0.035 
   0.003  0.004 0.016 0.002  0.002 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.006 0.012  0.011 0.014 0.009  0.006 0.007 0.008  0.008 0.026 
                                 
Father's 
occupation  0.047  0.044 0.062        0.095  0.091 0.113 0.052  0.052 0.079 0.061  0.053 0.057       
   0.002  0.003 0.011        0.010  0.013 0.026 0.011  0.012 0.019 0.011  0.013 0.035       
                                 
Father's 
education  0.132  0.142 0.222 0.152  0.178 0.276 0.117  0.126 0.173 0.145  0.164 0.257 0.101  0.096 0.116 0.120  0.113 0.112 
   0.006  0.010 0.039 0.017  0.023 0.047 0.014  0.018 0.038 0.024  0.029 0.062 0.016  0.017 0.034 0.014  0.017 0.049 
                                 
Mother's 
education  0.145  0.156 0.244 0.153  0.179 0.278 0.154  0.167 0.227 0.203  0.225 0.341 0.163  0.154 0.159 0.172  0.184 0.249 
   0.006  0.008 0.034 0.017  0.023 0.048 0.014  0.020 0.044 0.023  0.031 0.081 0.020  0.028 0.070 0.016  0.020 0.048 
                                 
Birth region  0.079  0.049 0.043 0.031  0.019 0.00 0.029  0.030 0.036 0.046  0.051 0.098 0.085  0.078 0.096 0.076  0.092 0.158 
   0.005  0.007 0.024 0.012  0.019 0.046 0.010  0.015 0.035 0.015  0.018 0.041 0.015  0.017 0.036 0.011  0.016 0.045 
  Sample: individuals 30-49 with positive income and information on a set of circumstances; standard errors in italics; father’s occupation missing for Colombia and Peru.   41
Table 8: Inequality of Opportunity Indices for Household Consumption Expenditures (per capita) 
   C OLOMBIA   E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
  E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) E(0)  E(1) E(2) 
                        
TOTAL INEQUALITY  0.449  0.503 1.013 0.354  0.375 0.574 0.409  0.436 0.676 0.381  0.374 0.539 0.351  0.384 0.660 
   0.018  0.024 0.079 0.015  0.018 0.047 0.024  0.023 0.039 0.016  0.019 0.042 0.015  0.022 0.076 
                          
NON PARAMETRIC 
ESTIMATES  
                       
N
d θ   0.265  0.275 0.177 0.344  0.347 0.270 0.524  0.536 0.440 0.417  0.385 0.285 0.348  0.339 0.229 
  0.017  0.017 0.013 0.021  0.025 0.028 0.023  0.026 0.031 0.016  0.018 0.020 0.017  0.017 0.016 
N
r θ   0.265  0.304 0.456 0.344  0.353 0.427 0.524  0.542 0.630 0.417  0.405 0.475 0.348  0.389 0.533 
   0.017  0.023 0.035 0.021  0.024 0.033 0.023  0.023 0.022 0.016  0.024 0.044 0.017  0.024 0.040 
                          
PARAMETRIC 
ESTIMATES 
                       
P
r θ   0.244  0.271 0.408 0.321  0.326 0.389 0.503  0.519 0.606 0.386  0.362 0.417 0.340  0.375 0.512 
   0.017  0.023 0.041 0.022  0.028 0.042 0.020  0.020 0.021 0.016  0.023 0.046 0.017  0.022 0.036 
J
r θ  
                         
Race  0.001  0.001 0.002 0.032  0.027 0.036 0.141  0.123 0.136 0.121  0.065 0.047 0.054  0.051 0.065 
   0.002  0.002 0.003 0.006  0.005 0.006 0.013  0.011 0.013 0.014  0.012 0.016 0.008  0.007 0.008 
                            
Father's occupation        0.106  0.103 0.120 0.073  0.071 0.088 0.071  0.069 0.090       
         0.010  0.011 0.018 0.011  0.011 0.015 0.011  0.010 0.013       
                            
Father's education  0.154  0.179 0.288 0.141  0.148 0.192 0.202  0.219 0.285 0.108  0.109 0.146 0.142  0.147 0.199 
   0.016  0.019 0.028 0.015  0.019 0.032 0.021  0.021 0.027 0.014  0.016 0.023 0.013  0.014 0.019 
                            
Mother's education  0.166  0.194 0.314 0.186  0.193 0.244 0.256  0.279 0.353 0.167  0.177 0.241 0.204  0.222 0.306 
   0.014  0.018 0.028 0.015  0.019 0.032 0.019  0.021 0.028 0.017  0.020 0.029 0.014  0.017 0.025 
                            
Birth region  0.040  0.032 0.035 0.040  0.044 0.058 0.102  0.103 0.137 0.096  0.096 0.127 0.109  0.124 0.195 
   0.011  0.016 0.033 0.010  0.014 0.025 0.014  0.015 0.020 0.015  0.016 0.023 0.013  0.019 0.038 
Sample: individuals 30-49 with positive household consumption and information on a set of circumstances; standard errors in italics; father’s occupation is 
missing for Colombia and Peru.   42
 
Table 9: Reduced-Form OLS Regression of Household Income on Observed 
Circumstances 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
           
Member of an ethnic minority  -0.414***  -0.015 -0.236***  -0.350***  -0.922***  -0.230*** 
 [0.009]  [0.032]  [0.025]  [0.036] [0.057]  [0.023] 
           
Father agricultural worker  -0.295***    -0.291***  -0.192***  -0.210***   
 [0.009]    [0.019]  [0.034]  [0.032]   
           
Father primary education  0.248***  0.218***  0.135***  0.166***  0.211***  0.189*** 
 [0.010]  [0.022]  [0.021]  [0.041] [0.044]  [0.026] 
           
Father  secondary  education  0.696***  0.689*** 0.446*** 0.386***  0.473***  0.442*** 
 [0.018]  [0.039]  [0.035]  [0.080] [0.057]  [0.031] 
           
Mother primary education  0.299***  0.245*** 0.254*** 0.362***  0.298***  0.215*** 
 [0.010]  [0.023]  [0.021]  [0.058] [0.043]  [0.026] 
           
Mother  secondary  education  0.789***  0.703*** 0.630*** 0.893***  0.768***  0.572*** 
 [0.018]  [0.039]  [0.035]  [0.082] [0.059]  [0.034] 
           
Birth region 2  -0.378***  0.176***  -0.124***  -0.278***  -0.044  0.058*** 
 [0.012]  [0.022]  [0.018]  [0.051] [0.043]  [0.021] 
           
Birth region 3  -0.740***  0.460***  0.170***  -0.258***  -0.361***  0.376*** 
 [0.013]  [0.028]  [0.025]  [0.045] [0.042]  [0.030] 
           
Constant 5.372***  11.578***  4.415***  5.857***  6.977***  5.786*** 
 [0.013]  [0.022]  [0.020]  [0.046] [0.053]  [0.023] 
           
Observations 71,670  22,436 12,643 6,847  5,649 13,649 
R-squared 0.32  0.19  0.24 0.28  0.34  0.25 
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Omitted 
categories are: male, ethnic majority, father and mother with no or unknown education, and birth 
region 1 (see Table 2 for the country-specific definitions). 
    
 
   43
Table 10: Reduced-Form OLS Regression of Household Consumption Expenditures 
on Observed Circumstances 
 
  COLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
       
Member of an ethnic minority  -0.043  -0.300*** -0.411*** -1.020*** -0.195*** 
  [0.028] [0.023] [0.025] [0.039] [0.017] 
       
Father  agricultural  worker    -0.254*** -0.190*** -0.202***  
    [0.017] [0.023] [0.023]  
       
Father  primary  education  0.196*** 0.159*** 0.130*** 0.171*** 0.145*** 
  [0.019] [0.018] [0.031] [0.031] [0.019] 
       
Father  secondary  education  0.615*** 0.470*** 0.472*** 0.368*** 0.364*** 
  [0.031] [0.032] [0.046] [0.042] [0.022] 
       
Mother primary education  0.234*** 0.275*** 0.374*** 0.189*** 0.196*** 
  [0.019] [0.018] [0.038] [0.030] [0.019] 
       
Mother  secondary  education  0.693*** 0.672*** 0.725*** 0.554*** 0.498*** 
  [0.033] [0.031] [0.052] [0.043] [0.025] 
       
Birth region 2  0.202***  -0.094***  -0.416***  -0.028  0.051*** 
  [0.018] [0.016] [0.033] [0.032] [0.016] 
       
Birth region 3  0.454***  0.215***  -0.283***  -0.257***  0.411*** 
  [0.023] [0.022] [0.028] [0.030] [0.023] 
       
Constant  14.216***  3.964*** 8.520*** 6.990*** 5.877*** 
  [0.020] [0.018] [0.029] [0.039] [0.017] 
       
Observations  22,487 12,643 6,865  5,686  13,649 
R-squared 0.22  0.31 0.47 0.42 0.31 
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Omitted categories are: male, ethnic majority, father and mother with no or unknown education, 
and birth region 1 (see Table 2 for the country-specific definitions). 
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Table 11: Opportunity-deprivation profiles 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
            
Member of ethnic minority 100.0  32.8 61.0 100.0  75.9  100.0 
            
Father's agricultural 
occupation 
87.9  93.4  99.9  83.5   
Other father's occupation  12.1    6.6  0.1  16.5   
            
Father without education   89.2 76.6 86.9  99.4  58.0  99.8 
            
Father's primary education  10.5 23.4 11.2  0.3  37.0  0.2 
            
Father's secondary education  
(or complete primary)  
0.3 0.0 1.9  0.3  5.0  0.0 
            
Mother without education  90.7 96.0 98.3  99.1  92.6  99.4 
            
Mother's primary education  9.3  3.8  1.1  0.3  5.7  0.0 
            
Mother's secondary education  
(or complete primary) 
0.0 0.2 0.6  0.6  1.7  0.6 
            























            
Share of total outcome  2.9 5.0 4.4  3.5  2.7  4.8 
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Table 12: Poverty profiles 
 
  BRAZIL C OLOMBIA E CUADOR G UATEMALA P ANAMA P ERU 
          
Member of ethnic minority  68.5  14.9  31.8  70.2  53.7  56.4 
          
Father's agricultural 
occupation 
56.3  80.0  75.7  80.3   
Other father's occupation  43.7    20.0  24.3  19.7   
          
Father without education   77.2 57.8 55.0  90.1 66.8  59.9 
          
Father's primary education  21.8 40.3 42.2  9.0 29.0  31.8 
Father's secondary education 
(or complete primary)   1.0 1.9 2.8  0.9 4.2  8.3 
          
Mother without education  79.4 53.5 59.7  96.3 75.2  82.5 
          
Mother's primary education  19.4  44.6  38.5  3.0  23.7  15.4 
          
Mother's secondary education 
(or complete primary) 
1.1 1.9 1.8  0.7 1.1  2.2 
          

































          
Share of total outcome  0.7 1.5 1.9  1.8 1.5  1.8 
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Figure 1: The distribution of earnings conditional on selected circumstance 
variables 
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Figure 2: The distribution of consumption conditional on selected circumstance 
variables 
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Figure 3: A visual representation of the opportunity share of inequality 
 
 
Per capita household consumption
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Appendix:   Table A.1: The opportunity-deprivation profiles for six Latin American countries. 















               






2,276,662 0.06776 105.9  0.261 





Sao Paulo or 
Federal District 
1,417 0.00004  116.5 0.287 
  black and mix-raced  agricultural worker  none or 
unknown 
lower primary  Nordeste or 
North 
313,664 0.00934 136.6  0.337 






352,729 0.01050 136.9  0.338 







7,564 0.00023  144.2 0.355 






2,063,415 0.06141 144.5  0.356 
                
Colombia  "indigena, gitano, 
archipielago, 
palenquero, negro or 
mulato" 




2,445 0.00022  1.352E+06  0.334 
  "indigena, gitano, 
archipielago, 






6,416 0.00058  1.664E+06  0.411 
  "indigena, gitano, 
archipielago, 
palenquero, negro or 
mulato" 
 None  none  Peripherical 
departments 
134,352 0.01207 1.733E+06  0.428 
  "indigena, gitano, 
archipielago, 




none Bogota  836 0.00008 1.897E+06  0.468 
  "indigena, gitano, 
archipielago, 
palenquero, negro or 
mulato" 
 None  none  Peripherical 
departments 
131,872 0.01185 1.989E+06  0.491 
  "indigena, gitano,    None  primary  Peripherical 41,942  0.00377 2.047E+06  0.506   50
archipielago, 
palenquero, negro or 
mulato" 
incomplete departments 




179,563 0.01613 2.049E+06  0.506 
  neither of previous    None  none  Peripherical 
departments 
541,572 0.04866 2.112E+06  0.522 
  "indigena, gitano, 
archipielago, 






47,602 0.00428  2.167E+06  0.535 




130,198 0.01170 2.263E+06  0.559 
                
Ecuador  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 




537 0.00017  27.59  0.176 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 




none or dnk  costa & insular  406  0.00013  35.42  0.217 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 








436 0.00014  38.64  0.231 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 
none or dnk  none or dnk  sierra & 
Amazonia 
104,561 0.03366 42.53  0.316 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 
none or dnk  primary  Pichincha or 
Azuay 
province 
1,537 0.00049  44.79 0.347 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, cuenta propia, rentista, or 
estudiante" 




232 0.00007  45.20   
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 




none or dnk  sierra & 
Amazonia 
1,112 0.00036  46.52 0.158 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 
Primary  none or dnk  sierra & 
Amazonia 
26,456 0.00852  47.35  0.180 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, cuenta propia, rentista, or 
estudiante" 
none or dnk  none or dnk  costa &  insular  3,295 0.00106  53.73 0.250   51
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 
Primary  none or dnk  costa & insular  7,644 0.00246  54.00 0.289 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 




primary  costa & insular  1,771 0.00057  57.02 0.296 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 




none or dnk  costa & insular  1,412 0.00045  58.00 0.297 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 
none or dnk  none or dnk  costa & insular  23,908  0.00770  58.12  0.303 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 








759 0.00024  62.05  0.310 
  "indigena, negro or 
mulato" 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, cuenta propia, rentista, or 
estudiante" 
none or dnk  none or dnk  sierra & 
Amazonia 
14,873 0.00479  63.96  0.330 
  neither of previous  agricultural or domestic worker: 
"jornalero, propria finca, domestico or 
que haceres" 
none or dnk  none or dnk  costa &  insular  181,135 0.05831 64.47  0.333 
                
Guatemala  indigenous maternal 
language 
agricultural worker: "jornalero, or 









564 0.00027  1276  0.176 
  indigenous maternal 
language 
agricultural worker: "jornalero, or 
trabajador de su propia finca" 
never gone 








520 0.00025  1571  0.217 
  indigenous maternal 
language 
agricultural worker: "jornalero, or 









591 0.00028  1671  0.231 
  indigenous maternal 
language 
other: "empleado asalariado, dueno o 
patron, independiente/inactivo 
never gone 







187 0.00009  2285  0.316 
  indigenous maternal 
language 
agricultural worker: "jornalero, or 
trabajador de su propia finca" 
never gone 
to school or 
dnk 
never gone to 
school or dnk 
North or North-
West 
216,583 0.10324 2514  0.347 
                
Panama  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
None none  rural  areas  30,591  0.04523  352.9  0.163 
  speaks indigenous  agricultural worker or inactive: secondary  primary  other urban  71  0.00011  408.2  0.189   52
language  "jornalero, propria finca, inactivo"  or more  centers 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, independiente, otro" 
secondary 
or more 
none  rural  areas  1,294 0.00191  416.4 0.193 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, independiente, otro" 
None none  city  or 
intermediate 
urban area 
240 0.00035  452.4  0.210 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, independiente, otro" 
None  none  rural  areas  5,443 0.00805  466.8 0.216 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
None none  other  urban 
centers 
641 0.00095  489.7  0.227 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
Primary primary  city  or 
intermediate 
urban area 
194 0.00029  560.4  0.260 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, independiente, otro" 
Primary secondary  or 
more 
rural areas  380  0.00056  601.8  0.279 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, dueño 
o patrón, independiente, otro" 
Primary none  rural  areas  1,449 0.00214  609.7 0.282 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
Primary primary  rural  areas  1,925 0.00285  611.8 0.283 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, 




primary rural  areas  472  0.00070  617.2  0.286 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
None primary  rural  areas  595  0.00088  627.0  0.290 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
Primary none  rural  areas 5922  0.00876 654.5  0.303 
  does not  agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
secondary 
or more 
none rural  areas  753 0.00111  709.8  0.329 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
secondary 
or more 
none rural  areas  388 0.00057  724.6  0.336 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
None primary  other  urban 
centers 
31 0.00005  741.8  0.344 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, 






rural areas  194  0.00029  744.6  0.345 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, 
dueño o patrón, independiente, 
otro" 
None primary  rural  areas  530  0.00078  770.6  0.357 
  speaks indigenous  agricultural worker or inactive:  None  none  city or  339  0.00050  788.0  0.365   53
language  "jornalero, propria finca, inactivo"  intermediate 
urban area 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, 




none city  or 
intermediate 
urban area 
178 0.00026  896.0  0.415 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, 
dueño o patrón, independiente, 
otro" 
Primary none  other  urban 
centers 
133 0.00020  907.7  0.420 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
other: "empleado, asalariado, 
dueño o patrón, independiente, 
otro" 
None none  other  urban 
centers 
232 0.00034  932.2  0.432 
  speaks indigenous 
language 
agricultural worker or inactive: 





rural areas  19  0.00003  947.6  0.439 
  does not  other: "empleado, asalariado, 






573 0.00085  1019.7  0.472 
  does not  agricultural worker or inactive: 
"jornalero, propria finca, inactivo" 
Primary none  rural  areas 20154  0.02980 1033.7  0.479 
                
Peru  speaks native 
language 
Missing None  primary 
complete 
Arequipa, 
Callao & Lima 
123 0.00003  76.1  0.082 
  speaks native 
language 





1,809 0.00038  331.4 0.359 







Callao & Lima 
1,009 0.00021  421.6 0.457 
 speaks  native 
language 
 None  none  southern  and 
other costal 
departments 
274,659 0.05727 429.6  0.466 
 speaks  native 
language 




390,630 0.08145 453.3  0.492 
 